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Introduction
By the early 1950s the Irish economy was in trouble. Emigration
was at record levels, the population was falling, unemployment
was high, and economic growth was stagnant. Economic
protectionism, introduced during the great depression, was still
in place, despite Western Europe experiencing rapid economic
growth as it recovered from the Second World War. This led to a
questioning, and the eventual overthrow, of extant industrial
policy in Ireland. This paper, utilising Hogan and Doyle’s (2007)
critical juncture framework, examines the move from
protectionism to an outward-looking industrial policy to
discover the nature of this policy change.
According to the critical juncture framework, a critical juncture
consists of a crisis, ideational change and radical policy change.
A crisis can undermine a policy, but will not transform that
policy. Radical policy change depends upon societal actors
uniting around a new idea. A crisis creates the environment
wherein change agents contest extant ideas and the policy based
upon them. Ideational change links crisis to policy change. The
framework rests upon the hypothesis that a crisis-induced
consolidation of a new idea – replacing an extant paradigm –
leads to radical policy change. Without ideational change, policy
instrument settings, and the instruments themselves, may change
but the hierarchy of goals underpinning a policy will remain
unaltered. This framework is capable of explaining why certain
crises lead to critical junctures in policies, whereas others do not.
Policy change and its identification
Critical junctures are seen as branching points that set processes
of institutional/policy change in motion, ultimately resulting in
the adoption of an institutional arrangement from among
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alternatives (Mahoney, 2000). Thereafter, the pathway
established funnels units in a particular direction, with increasing
returns and resultant irreversibilities (Mahoney, 2003). Utilising
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007) critical juncture framework, we
examine change in Irish industrial policy during the 1950s in
three stages: the economic situation, ideational change and the
nature of policy change.
The first stage tests for economic crisis. A crisis implies prevailing
policy cannot be sustained without deterioration (Haggard and
Kaufman, 1995). Policy change often follows policy failure
(Walsh, 2006), with external shocks often blamed for such
failures (Greener, 2001). An economic crisis, therefore, can
influence policy preferences (Stevenson, 2001), as it can unleash
powerful forces of change in an economy (Haggard, 2003). As
definitions of an economic crisis vary, we develop encompassing
observable implications.
The framework’s second stage tests for ideational change. New
ideas can change the policy environment (Pemberton, 2000).
Our observable implications draw on the work of Legro (2000),
who developed the concept of collapse and consolidation in the
process of ideational change. The premise is that a broad range
of change agents perceive an extant paradigm as inadequate
(collapse) and coalesce (consolidation) in support of an
alternative idea.
The framework’s third stage tests the nature of policy change
through observable implications based on the work of Hall
(1993), which argues that there are three orders of policy change:
first, second and third. These enable us to identify, and
differentiate, paradigmatic from other forms of change.
Testing for a macroeconomic crisis
Scholars regularly ‘agree that severe recessions make significant
structural changes possible because they render politics highly
fluid’ (Garrett, 1993: 522). However, economic crises are rare,
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rendering definition and identification difficult (Yu, Lai and
Wang, 2006). How, then, do we define and identify an economic
crisis? Stone (1989) argues that a situation does not become a
problem until it is amenable to control. But, if something is
controllable, it must be measurable, otherwise how would we
know if we are controlling it. An economic crisis must be quanti -
fiable, and it is from quantification that identification comes.
Pei and Adesnik (2000) developed a range of criteria for
macroeconomic crises: annual inflation greater than 15 per cent,
stagnant or negative annual gross domestic product (GDP)
growth, and historians and other analysts’ descriptions of
significant deterioration in economic circumstances. For Kwon
(2001) and Solimano (2005), a macroeconomic crisis can be
identified through general indicators and perceptions of growth,
inflation, employment creation, poverty reduction and their
combined socio-psychological burden on society. Ultimately, to
define something as complex as a macroeconomic crisis requires
subjective and objective deliberations (Pei and Adesnik, 2000).
We develop a range of observable implications that build upon
previous studies through a combination of quantitative and
qualitative measures (Hogan and Doyle, 2007). These observ -
ables accept that a macroeconomic crisis constitutes an economic
low point. Thus, the economy may have been in crisis if: 
O1. The main economic indicators were in decline/stagnation.
O2. The national/international media regarded the economy to
be in crisis.
O3. Economic and political commentators regarded the
economy to be in crisis.
O4. The central bank regarded the economy to be in crisis.
O5. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Develop ment (OECD) regarded the economy to be in
crisis.
O6 Elected representatives regarded the economy to be in
crisis.
O7. Government pronouncements on the economy were
consistent with a crisis management approach.
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The state of the Irish economy in the 1950s 
After independence, the Free State government of Cumann na
nGaedhael employed a free trade policy, centred on agriculture.
However, after Fianna Fáil came to power in 1932, in the depths
of the Great Depression, economic policy focused on
protectionism and on developing domestic industries behind
tariffs. This was a process underway in many countries at the
time; however, Irish protectionism was driven by cultural
isolationism. Political independence came to be equated with
economic nationalism (Ó Tuathaigh, 1986). The naivety was
that homemade economic policy was not necessarily better
policy. For Ireland, the benefits of protectionism – meagre
industrial expansion – had been reaped by the end of the 1930s
(Haughton, 1995). From the late 1940s, the economy stagnated
as industry supplied a saturated domestic market (Hillery, 1980).
The economic indicators examined here paint a grim picture. 
Table 1:Main Economic Indicators, 1950 – 1959 
Year Unemploy- Inflation Government Growth Industrial Economic
ment Percentage Debt/GNP in Real Disputes Openness1
Percentage ratio GDP days lost 
(‘000s) 
1950 7.5 0.0 N/A* 1.9 217 70.9
1951 7.3 11.25 49.9 1.9 545 82.6
1952 9.1 10.1 N/A 2.26 529 69.6
1953 9.6 2.04 N/A 2.5 82 66.9
1954 8.1 2.0 N/A 0.9 67 65.5
1955 6.8 1.9 N/A 1.9 236 67.2
1956 7.7 4.4 N/A –1.45 48 63.9
1957 9.2 2.57 N/A 0.98 92 62.7
1958 8.6 2.6 N/A –2.2 126 62.9
1959 8.0 –0.85 55.5 4.1 124 62.7 
Sources: Statistical Office of the European Communities (1997); Heston,
Summers and Aten (2002); Leddin and Walsh (1998); Mitchell (1993).
*Not Available
1 Measured by the trade to GDP ratio. This is acquired by adding the value of
imports and exports and dividing by GDP.
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From Table 1, it is clear that the Debt/GNP ratio deteriorated
between the available figures for 1951 and 1959, and the level of
economic openness reached a decade-long low in 1959. For the
other four indicators, their low points came throughout the
1950s. Unemployment peaked at almost 10 per cent in 1953.
However, this figure conceals the fact that tens of thousands were
leaving the country annually in search of work. In 1952,
inflation peaked at over 11 per cent, while in 1959, the economy
experienced deflation. The economy shrank by over two per cent
in 1958, having previously contracted in 1956. Between 1951
and 1958, GDP rose by an average of less than one per cent per
annum, employment declined by 12 per cent, unemployment
rose, half a million emigrated and the population dropped to its
lowest level (Haughton, 1995). 
The Irish Independent (1959a) argued that the foundations of the
economy were in need of repair. Time International (1958)
remarked that there had been few economic advances for Ireland
during the 1950s. The Irish Times (1959a) observed that
employment was in decline, and the cost of living had gone ‘sky
high’. The Economist (1959) concluded that, prior to 1959, most
indicators of Irish economic performance were dire. By mid
1958, the Irish Independent (1958a) was arguing that economic
isolation was impractical. 
The OECD (1961) and the Central Bank of Ireland (1961) saw
the 1950s as a decade of economic depression. Agricultural
production was abnormally low, industrial output was faltering
(OECD, 1961) and there was a large external trade deficit
(Central Bank of Ireland, 1957). The Central Bank (1957: 34)
observed that ‘[t]he present economic and financial situation
scarcely justifies the retention of confidence in large-scale
expenditure on public works and social amenities as a means of
stimulating useful economic activity’. It further spoke of the
dangers of insolvency, and how this would result in a level of
emigration to dwarf anything experienced previously, and the
end of financial independence. The Central Bank (1958) argued
that too little expenditure had been set aside for productive
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investment. This was despite the favourable influences on
production, the efforts devoted to the development of sheltered
industries catering for the home market, a high level of social
investment, and large scale external borrowing (Central Bank of
Ireland, 1959).
Ó Gráda and O’Rourke (1995: 214) argue that, ‘in the 1950s,
Ireland’s relative [economic] performance was disastrous, poorer
than that of the UK as well as the European average’. Lyons
(1973: 618) observed that a:
serious crisis of confidence developed, caused by widespread
anxiety that the performance of the economy was so poor the
country was falling behind Western European standards, not
only in productivity, but in the social benefits productivity
might be expected to confer.
According to Whitaker (1973), by 1957 the economy was
plumbing the depths of hopelessness. Stop-go policies, in which
adverse balance of payments signalled drastic fiscal actions to
follow, produced fiscal contractions in 1952 and 1957 (Kennedy
and Dowling, 1975). Meanwhile, the economies of Europe were
achieving robust growth (MacSharry and White, 2001).
Politicians from across the political spectrum ‘realised that the
Irish economy could not survive in isolation’ (Murphy, 1997).
Senior Fianna Fáil politician, Seán MacEntee, argued that
Ireland would have to face up to its economic difficulties if it was
to maintain its sovereignty (The Irish Times, 1959b: 5). Daniel
Desmond of Labour said that it was time for the political
establishment to realise that solving the problems with the
economy superseded their power struggles (Irish Independent,
1959b). Richard Mulcahy, leader of Fine Gael, remarked that a
tremendous effort would be required by all sections of the
community to right the economy (Dáil Debates, Vol.171 Col.
1320, 2 December 1958). As Tánaiste, Seán Lemass said ‘we
have got to demonstrate beyond question the capacity to develop
a viable economy’ (DD, Vol.174 Col 1122, 28 April, 1959),
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adding, when he became Taoiseach, that task for the generation
of the 1950s was to ‘consolidate the economic foundations of our
political independence’ (The Irish Times, 1959c: 8). While
opposition parties might be expected to talk down the economy,
when the government is in agreement with their evaluations,
there can be no mistaking the gravity of the situation.
Table 2: Identification of macroeconomic crisis
Observable Implications Ireland
1950s 
O1 – Main economic indicators in decline/stagnation Y 
O2 – National/international media regarded the economy 
in crisis Y 
O3 – Economic/political commentators regarded the 
economy in crisis Y 
O4 – Central Bank regarded the economy in crisis Y 
O5 – OECD regarded the economy in crisis Y 
O6 – Elected representatives regarded the economy in crisis Y
O7 – Government pronouncements consistent with crisis 
management approach Y 
Economic Crisis Y 
From Table 2, it is clear that the Irish economy was in crisis
during the 1950s, with all observable implications satisfied by
our findings. The next section tests for changes in the ideas
underlying industrial policy.
Testing for ideational change
Previous policies can be discredited due to their implication in,
or inability to right, a crisis (Levy, 1994). Although economic
crises can have great impact, they will not determine policy,
whose formulation is ‘centred in domestic political and
ideational processes’ (Golob, 2003: 375). Hogan and Doyle’s
(2007) framework contends that significant policy change
depends upon actors reaching consensus upon, and
consolidating around, a set of new ideas. Actors utilise new ideas
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to chart new policy strategy (McNamara, 1998). Ideas function
as coalition-building resources among change agents who
attempt to resolve crises (Blyth, 2002). When an economic
model is in difficulty, windows of opportunity appear in which
change agents contest the viability of the prevailing paradigm
(Kingdon, 1995). Ideational change stands between a crisis 
and policy change, determining if a crisis results in policy
change. 
Hogan and Doyle (2007) contend that new ideas are introduced
into the policy domain by three types of change agents. The first
group consists of outside influencers, such as the media, the
OECD, IMF the World Bank, trade unions, employer
organisations, and consumer groups. They critique an existing
economic paradigm, advocating a new one. The second group
are Kingdon’s (1995) ‘policy entrepreneurs’. These are change
agents who spread ideas to replace the current paradigm. They
may be civil servants, technocrats, academics, economists, and
interest groups. The most important change agents are ‘political
entrepreneurs’ (Dahl, 1961). Political entrepreneurs ‘exploit
moments of instability’ and ‘invest resources in the creation of a
new policy or new forms of collective action’ (Sheingate, 2003:
188-190). In a crisis, a political leader, usually an opposition
leader, will seek new economic policy ideas to rectify the ills of
the existing paradigm. Policy entrepreneurs and outside
influences produce ideas, but political entrepreneurs introduce
ideas into the policy process. 
According to Legro’s (2000) two-stage model of ideational
change, if agents agree the existing ideational paradigm is
deficient and should be replaced, the first stage – ideational
collapse – has occurred. Following are observables for ideational
collapse:
O1. The media questions the efficacy of the current model.
O2. Opposition political parties critique the current model and
propose alternative ideas – at election time their platform
will be built around these alternatives.
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O3. Civil society organisations, e.g., labour unions, employer
organisations etc. critique the current model.
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current
paradigm, observable through opinion polls etc.
O5. External or international organisations critique the current
model and/or actively disseminate alternative ideas.
As agents debate the viability of the old model, they generate
solutions to its ills through new ideas. However, ‘even when
ideational collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus on a
replacement could still produce continuity, as society reflexively
re-embraces the old orthodoxy’ (Legro, 2000: 424). The issue is
reaching consensus on a new set of ideas. If consensus is
achieved, it marks the second stage of Legro’s model,
consolidation, with agents coordinating a replacement set of
ideas to challenge the dominant creed. This can be seen in
political entrepreneurs consolidating innovations by combining
interests to produce a winning coalition (Sheingate, 2003).
Following are observables for new ideational consolidation:
O6. A clear set of alternative ideas, developed by policy
entrepreneurs, is evident.
O7. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur), injecting new
ideas into the policy arena, is evident.
O8. The political entrepreneur combines interests to produce
consensus around a replacement paradigm.
The greater the consensus encompassing an idea the more
protected the policies derived from it. Protected policies
represent continuity, whereby once a policy has become
institutionally embedded, ‘policy-making becomes possible only
in terms of these ideas’ (Blyth, 2001: 4).
The ideas underlying industrial policy
Economic stagnation led to a ‘vigorous debate on the economy’
(O’Day, 2000: 27). This was conducted amongst civil society
groups and within the media, where they questioned the efficacy
of protectionism. The Irish Independent (1958b) observed THAT
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there was a pressing need to expand exports to permit the
expansion of industry and increased employment. The
Federation of Irish Manufacturers (FIM) called for an
investigation of the impact on Irish industry of a managed free
trade regime (Irish Independent, 1958c: 10). By the early 1950s,
with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in existence,
protectionism was swimming against the tide.
The Industrial Development Authority (IDA), established in
1949 to encourage indigenous industries, was tasked with
increasing exports. Soon afterwards the IDA was advocating
export led industrialisation, with foreign investment as its
driving force. A couple of years later, Córas Tráchtála Teoranta
(CTT, the Irish Trade Company) was established to promote
exports to North America. Extant policy was stretched to
incorporate aspects of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI)
and encouraging exports. Ideas associated with an outward-
looking economic strategy were utilised by the Minister for
Industry and Commerce, William Norton, in 1955 (Tansey,
1998). In public statements, Norton signalled the need to attract
FDI to facilitate industrial expansion (Dáil Éireann Debates, 23
March, 1955, Vol.149, Col.525). The Finance Act of 1956 was
designed to encourage exports by Irish and foreign companies
using Ireland as a base. The government’s attitude changed 
from encouraging the purchasing of Irish goods under all
circumstances, to encouraging their purchase only if ‘first class
products at a reasonable price’ (The Irish Times, 1956: 11). These
innovations were supported by employer groups and trade
unions (Suarez, 2001). The policy changes prior to 1957, such as
the Finance Act of 1956 and the Underdeveloped Areas Act of
1952, were essentially last-ditch efforts to maintain
protectionism. Consequently, ‘1957 is conventionally thought of
as the end of an era, marking the final exhaustion of the ideas of
the first generation of political leaders’ (Garvin, 1982: 37). 
Instead of improving matters, the alterations to protectionism
contradicted its intellectual coherence. The protectionist policy
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matrix, made up of a range of legislation, import levies and
customs duties developed over more than a generation, was
fraying (Donnelly, 2007). Lynch (1959) argued that the old
economic policies had failed. The Irish Times (1959d) argued
that the results of protectionism were: the sheltering of
inefficient firms producing inferior goods, and the bad will Irish
exporters had to face abroad. 
In an environment of disappointing economic performance,
contestation of the orthodoxy underlying extant industrial
policy, by agents agreed on its inadequacy, resulted in its collapse.
The 1957 election was fought by Fianna Fáil attacking the
economic model it created. Lemass argued that increased
employment would only come from exports, and that this was
possible by attracting in foreign capital, and through tax
exemption for exporting firms (The Irish Times, 1957a). Fianna
Fáil won the election due to the state of the economy and the
coalition government’s failure to right it (The Irish Times,
1957b). Lemass became Minister for Industry and Commerce
and ‘[o]n his return to office [he] began the process of opening
the state to foreign investment’ (Girvin, 1994: 125), a process
tentatively in motion under the preceding government
(Donnelly, 2007).
In a debate on the Control of Manufacturers Bill, 1957, Lemass
stated that ‘a number of new concerns and externally-promoted
undertakings geared for export could make a very substantial
contribution to the development of our trade…a contribution
which…is so essential to our economic well-being’ (Dáil Éireann
Debates, 20 February, 1958, Vol.165, Col.534). This was
recognition that the state had reached the end of the road with
protectionism. Lemass’s thinking was heavily influenced by T.K.
Whitaker, who, as Secretary of the Department of Finance from
1956, was committed to export-led growth. This commitment
came from his recognition that economic policies pursued to
that time had failed (Lee, 1989). He advanced and set out a
three-pronged strategy – more planning, fewer tariff barriers, and
a greater emphasis on productive investment – in Economic
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Development (Department of Finance, 1958a), which contained
ideas that had been gestating for some time, as indicated by his
1956 paper Capital formation, saving and economic progress.
Murphy (1997) argues that Economic Development marked the
culmination of a major strand of activism within parts of the
higher echelons of the civil service.
Lemass assumed the role of a political entrepreneur,
championing economic openness. There followed a reappraisal
of the policies pursued since the 1930s. Encapsulating a
comprehensive overview of the economy, Economic Development
pointed to the fact that extant policy had failed to deal with the
economy’s problems: ‘The policies, hitherto followed, though
given a fair trial, have not resulted in a viable economy’
(Department of Finance, 1958a: 2). Few politicians, either in
government, or opposition, as well as the newspapers, took
notice of Economic Development (Murphy, 2005). What proved
to be the most important Irish economic policy document
garnered almost no attention upon publication, its significance
recognised only by the entrepreneurial network (Whitaker and
his colleagues within the Department of Finance) that fostered it
and the political entrepreneur who championed it. 
Economic Development (Department of Finance, 1958a)
proposed opening the economy with a transition to free trade,
stimulation of private investment, the introduction of grants and
tax concessions to encourage export manufacturing, and the
inducement of direct investment by foreign, export-oriented
manufacturers. It was the genesis of a new paradigm to manage
the economy. Whitaker is the prime policy entrepreneur, as his
ideas in Economic Development formed the backbone of the 1958
White Paper, Programme for Economic Expansion (Horgan,
1997). Drawn up under the supervision of Lemass, this white
paper laid out a coherent set of new ideas, based on an outward-
looking strategy and/or planned capitalism (Horgan, 1997).
Lemass succeeded De Valera as Taoiseach in 1959. The ideas
propagated by Lemass and Whitaker persuaded the opposition
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parties who coalesced around them (Irish Independent, 1959b).
Thus, political consensus was reached on a replacement set of
economic ideas, consolidating a dominant new ideational
orthodoxy. It was clear by the early summer of 1959 that
academia and representatives of leading interest groups were
rowing in behind Economic Development (The Irish Times,
1959e). Lemass now had the mandate and opportunity to inject
the new ideas into the policy arena. 
There was ideational collapse as change agents critiqued
protectionism. Whitaker, and the Department of Finance,
played the role of policy entrepreneurs, while other change
agents (the outside influences), such as the newspapers, the trade
unions, and other interest groups, supported the ideas in
Economic Development. Lemass was the political entrepreneur
they rallied around, as he championed their reform plans in the
political arena. The previous coalition government’s attempt to
open the economy was not a break with protectionism, but a
stretching of that paradigm. Having reached the point of failing,
Lemass threw protectionism out, replacing it with an outward-
orientated paradigm.
From Table 3 we see that the ideas underpinning industrial
policy, focused on protectionism, collapsed under the weight of
criticism. In the wake of this collapse, change agents put forward
a range of alternative ideas, with those of Whitaker being
championed by Lemass.
Identification of policy change
We hypothesise that once there is political entrepreneur-led
consolidation around a new set of ideas (ideational change),
significant policy change should follow. The observable
implications are based upon Hall’s (1993) concepts of first,
second and third order change: a first order policy change
involves alteration to the settings of policy instruments; a second
order change involves alteration to the instruments of policy; and
a third order policy change sees the goals of policy changing – a
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paradigmatic change. Thus, following are observables for
identification of policy change:
O1. If industrial policy instrument settings changed, there may
have been a first order policy change. 
O2. If the instruments of industrial policy changed, there may
have been a second order policy change. 
O3. If the goals behind industrial policy changed (swiftly and
for longer than a government’s term of office), there may
have been a third order policy change. 
These observables enable us identify, and differentiate, normal
and fundamental shifts in policy. They also incorporate the idea
of swift and enduring change developed by Hogan and Doyle
(2007). As we are dealing with the concept of a critical juncture
(radical change), we assume this is not a long process, otherwise
it would be incremental. Also, if the change is to endure in an
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Table 3: Identification of (i) ideational collapse and (ii) new
ideational consolidation
Observable Implications Ireland
1950s 
(i) Ideational Collapse
O1 – Media questions current model Y 
O2 – Opposition political parties critique current model/
propose alternatives Y 
O3 – Civil society organisations critique current model Y 
O4 – Widespread public dissatisfaction with current model Y 
O5 – External/international organisations critique and/or 
disseminate alternatives Y 
(ii) New Ideational Consolidation
O6 – Clear set of alternative ideas evident Y
O7 – Clear change agent evident Y 
O8 – Political entrepreneur combines interests to produce 
consensus around new idea Y 
Adoption of New Idea Y
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environment of competing policy entrepreneurs and ideas, it
should survive a change of government. 
Development of industrial policy 
In response to economic crisis, the coalition government (1954-
7) began to actively encourage foreign investment to fill gaps left
by indigenous industry through such actions as extending the
remit of the IDA within the confines of the Control of
Manufacturers Acts (1932 and 1934) and introducing tax breaks
and grants (Donnelly, 2007). However, to regard these policy
changes as a break with protectionism would be incorrect, for
they were a form of institutional layering in the context of
paradigm stretching; the overarching protectionist framework
remained. However, the abiding inefficiencies of the
protectionist path were immune to incremental changes. At
most, the policy decisions up to 1957 constituted second order
changes.
Under Lemass, an outward-orientated strategy became the
bedrock of industrial policy. The Industrial Development
(Encouragement of External Investment) Act of 1958 eased
restrictions on foreign ownership of industry. During the debate
on this Act, Lemass pointed out that industrial policy had moved
from focusing on import-substitution and indigenous industry
to encouraging exports and FDI (Dáil Éireann Debates, 20
February, 1958, Vol.165, Col.533). Lemass had come to
consider the Control of Manufacturers Acts (1932 and 1934) as
an impediment to development (Dáil Éireann Debates, 20
February, 1958, Vol.165, Col.533), with FDI now seen as a
means of addressing the shortage of capital, export inexperience
and high unemployment. Legislation signalling that FDI geared
towards exports was welcome marked a shift in policy, requiring
a significant investment of political capital by all concerned,
most especially Lemass.
The Programme for Economic Expansion (Department of Finance,
1958b) stated that the way forward for the economy was through
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industrial expansion based on exports. The likely emergence of a
free trade area in Europe, in the wake of the creation of the
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, informed
ideas as to how industrial development would have to target
export-orientated projects that would perform well in open
competition. The message at the heart of the First Programme
was that protectionism was unrealistic.
Lemass accelerated opening of the economy by bringing down
barriers to FDI. Adjusting industries to competition led public
policy into the realms of industrial relations and pay bargaining.
Lemass understood government had to play a more active role in
the Irish economy, but realised that this strategy required a new
partnership with different interests, who would become players
in the policy game (Murphy, 1997). Trade unions and employer
organisations were brought into the policy-making environment
through the Employer-Labour Conference (ELC). 
The institutions established in the early 1950s as part of the
protectionist matrix (IDA, CTT) were sufficiently flexible to
support the moves towards an outward-looking, and increasingly
active, industrial development policy. The Programme for
Economic Expansion (Department of Finance, 1958b) concluded
that the state should provide facilities to encourage industrial
development, remove policies hampering that development and
welcome FDI. The Second Programme for Economic Expansion
(Department of Finance 1963, 1964) signalled the repeal of the
Control of Manufacturers Acts, on the grounds that foreign
investment supported indigenous efforts to grow the economy
and create jobs, and increasing resources were given to the IDA
to attract FDI. The government also pursued an increasingly
liberal trade policy (OECD, 1962), with accession to the EEC
becoming the objective of this transformed policy paradigm. All
in all, the collective mindset had disengaged from protectionism
towards free trade and the necessity of FDI to development.
Table 4 shows that industrial policy’s instrument settings, the
instruments themselves, and the goals behind it changed, thus
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representing a third order change in industrial policy. This
occurred following macroeconomic crisis, collapse of the
dominant industrial orthodoxy, the introduction of new ideas
into the policy arena, and the consolidation of change agents
around these ideas. In sum, this constituted a critical juncture in
industrial policy.
Conclusion
We sought to provide a better understanding of the nature of
change in Irish industrial policy at the end of the 1950s. The
framework employed was based upon the hypothesis that a
critical juncture in policy consists of crisis, ideational change and
radical policy change. Through empirical examination of this
hypothesis, we found a critical juncture in Irish industrial policy
in the 1950s. In the midst of a macroeconomic crisis calling into
question the viability of the state, established industrial polices
based around protectionism, having been undermined by
previous failures, were overcome by change agents, led by a
political entrepreneur, and consolidating around new ideas to
open the economy and pursue FDI with zealousness. Lemass,
influenced by Whitaker, and protectionism’s failure, occupied
the role of political entrepreneur, fostering the alternative ideas
on industrial policy, around which change agent consensus
developed, and radical policy change followed.  
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Table 4: Identification of change in government economic policy
Observable Implications Ireland
1959 
(i) Ideational Collapse
O1 – Industrial policy instrument settings changed Y 
O2 – Instruments of industrial policy changed Y 
O3 – Goals behind industrial policy changed Y 
Critical Juncture in Macroeconomic Policy Y
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